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The Rights of Private Parties: Procedure and 
Review Under the Antidumping Legislation of 
the European Economic Community and the 
United States 
by Nerys A.Jefford* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC, Commu-
nity) envisioned a community encompassing a customs union, and the free 
movement of labor, goods, and capital. It also established a number of common 
policies, including the common commercial policy governing the Member States' 
external trade relations. A general aim of the union, declared in Article 110 of 
the EEC Treaty, is to contribute to free international trade} Article 113 states 
more specifically: 
After the transitional period has ended, the common commercial 
policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard 
to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agree-
ments, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, 
export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be 
taken in the case of dumping or subsidies.2 
In the area of dumping and subsidization, the Community has had a coherent 
policy since 1968, when the Councils adopted Regulation (EEC) 459/68,4 drafted 
to accord with the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the 
* B.A. (Oxon.), LL.M. (Virginia), of Gray's Inn, Barrister. My thanks for their teaching and en-
couragement to Mr. Monroe Leigh of Steptoe & johnson, Washington, D.C., Mr. Alexandre Kafka of 
the International Monetary Fund, Professor john Norton Moore, Walter L. Brown Professor of Law 
at the University of Virginia School of Law, Miss A.S. Kennedy, Fellow of Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford 
and Mr. E. Barendt, Fellow of St. Catherine's College, Oxford. 
I Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done at Rome, March 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 3, art. 110 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome or EEC Treaty]. 
2Id. at art. 113. 
• The institutions of the Community are the Council, the Commission, the Court of justice and the 
Assembly or European Parliament. Id. at art. 4. A common procedure is for the Council to adopt 
legislative acts, acting on a recommendation from the Commission. 
40.]. EUR. COMM. Special Edition (No. L 93) 1 (1968). 
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)5 reached at the Kennedy 
Round of GATT negotiations (1964-67). Following the Tokyo Round (1973-
79), the Commission signed the final package of Agreements on behalf of the 
Communities on December 17, 1979, and on December 20,1979, the Council 
amended the rules on antidumping to take account of these new international 
commitments.6 Regulation (EEC) 3017179 was subsequently amended7 and the 
current controlling legislation is Council Regulation No. 2176/84.8 
Although low price imports can cause substantial and irreparable damage to 
domestic industries, Article VI of the GATT does not contemplate a prohibition 
of such competitive, free trade practices. Rather it condemns certain unfair 
trade practices.9 Thus, the EEC permits an antidumping duty to be applied "to 
any dumped product whose release for free circulation in the Community causes 
injury."10 Any product "shall be considered to have been dumped if its export 
price to the Community is less than the normal value of the like product."J1 
Commentators maintain that the availability of these duties should not en-
courage the Community to blame all of its ills on low-priced imports and to 
penalize exporters indiscriminately and illegitimately. Mr. Haferkamp, a Vice 
President of the Commission, has said that .dumping provisions are subject to 
legal rules: "We have observed these and shall continue to observe them and 
we cannot stick the dumping label on everything we find inconvenient. We 
cannot fish the dumping label out of the drawer whenever competition gets 
awkward."12 In contrast, however, Mr. Ivo van Bael, a Belgian practitioner in 
the area, has commented that where the common commercial policy is con-
cerned, he "would only change the word 'policy' into 'politics."'13 
What is clear is that in an area that is so politically volatile and so full of 
potential abuse, there is a strong need for a fair and reasonable procedure 
controlling the imposition of duties, with ready opportunities for review, both 
5 GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/232, reprinted in, H.R. Doc. No. 153,311, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 257 
(1979). 
622 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 339) I (1979). 
7 Regulation No. 1580/82,25 OJ. EUR COMM. (No. L 178) 9 (1982). 
827 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 201) I (1984) [hereinafter Antidumping Regulation]; See also 17 EUR. 
COMM. BULL. (No.5) 74, pt. 2.2.7 (1984) for legislative history of this regulation. 
9 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, EEC, 
art. VI, 61 Stat. A-II, T.l.A.S. No. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 180. 
!O Antidumping Regulation, sup~a note 8, at art. 2(A)(I). In compliance with article VI of the GATT, 
"causing injury" is defined in article 4 of the regulation as "causing or threatening to cause material 
injury to an established Community industry or materially retarding the establishment of such an 
industry." /d. at art. 4(1). 
II /d. at art. 2(A)(2). 
12 Remarks of Vice President Haferkamp, 21 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. 229) 46 (1978)(Debates of European 
Parliament). 
13 Oldekop & van Bael, European Antidumping Law and Procedure, I MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUDIES 
237 (Jackson ed. 1979). 
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at the administrative and at the judicial level. This is acknowledged in the 
preamble to the Antidumping Regulation which includes the following recita-
tions: 
Whereas it is appropriate to lay down clearly the rules of proce-
dure to be followed during the investigation, in particular the rights 
and obligations of the Community authorities and the parties in-
volved, and the conditions under which interested parties may have 
access to information and may ask to be informed of the essential 
facts and considerations on the basis of which it is intended to 
recommend definitive measures; 
Whereas it is appropriate to provide for open and fair procedures 
for the review of measures taken, and for the investigation to be 
reopened when the circumstances so require. 14 
This Article is concerned specifically with the procedural aspects of the Com-
munity's antidumping regime. The author addresses only the European Eco-
nomic Community, and not the European Coal and Steel Community; the article 
is written for an audience with a minimal understanding of the structure and 
legal nature of the Community. Consequently, to highlight the points made, 
comparisons will be drawn with the u.S. position on the same issues. 
This Article examines the complaint and investigative process and the pro-
visions for review by the institutions of the Community, open to exporters, 
importers, Community producers, and other affected groups within the Com-
munity. 
The Author's approach is a practical one, pointing out the stages of anti-
dumping proceedings when review might be desirable and examining potential 
grounds for review. The Article also addresses the particularly thorny problems 
of admissibility. While the subject matter is of considerable importance to the 
trade groups involved, until recently little was written on this particular aspect 
of the EEC's antidumping provisions. This may be explained by the fact that 
judicial review involves the application of general principles to a specific piece 
of legislation. This Article suggests, however, that the European Court of Justice 
is beginning to recognize some of the distinctive features of antidumping pro-
ceedings and to modify its approach accordingly. This Article shows why such 
tendencies are wholly supportable and is, therefore, a speculative treatment of 
the area. Antidumping procedure and review is still a developing field for the 
Community and for the Court; indeed, the ramifications of recent cases remain 
largely undetermined. 
14 Antidumping Regulation, supra note 8. 
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II. ANTIDUMPING PROCEEDINGS 
The relevant procedure for seeking action against dumping and subsequent 
courses of action available to the Community are set forth in Articles 5 to 13 of 
the 1984 Regulation. ls Investigation of a complaint is undertaken by the Com-
mission, which then makes recommendations to the Council. The Council for-
mally decides on the final course of action, but always follows the Commission's 
recommendations. 
A complaint may be lodged, in writing, with the Commission or a Member 
State by "[a]ny natural or legal person, or any association not having legal 
personality, acting on behalf of a Community industry which considers itself 
injured or threatened by dumped ... imports."16 Community industry generally 
means the producers, as a whole, of the product which is like that being 
dumped,17 or those producers whose output constitutes a major percentage of 
the total Community production. Exceptions are provided when there is a 
special relationship between the exporter and the Community producer and 
where market conditions are such that the effect on producers in a discrete 
regional area should be considered. IS 
The complaint must contain sufficient evidence both of dumping and of 
injury before the Commission is obligated to undertake an investigation. In 
practice, the Commission uses a questionnaire to help complainants provide the 
appropriate information. 19 The meaning of sufficient evidence, however, is 
unclear. It would not appear to be a standard of proof beyond all reasonable 
doubt; it may not even mean proof on the balance of probabilities, but simply 
that there must be some reasonable evidence to support the complaint. 
Upon receipt of the complaint, the Commission will undertake a preliminary 
investigation and at this stage is required20 to hold consultations on relevant 
issues such as the existence of dumping, or injury and of the causal connection 
between the twO. 21 Once the Commission has reached a conclusion as to whether 
15 [d. at arts. 5-13. 
16 [d. at art. 5. 
17 [d. at art. 2(F)(12). 
18 [d. at art. 4(5). 
19 CUNNANE & STANBROOK, DUMPING AND SUBSIDIES: THE LAW AND PROCEDURE GOVERNING THE 
IMPOSITION OF ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 78 (1983). 
See also Vermulst, Dumping in the United States and the European Community: A Comparative Analysis, LEGAL 
ISSUES IN EUR. INTEGRATION 103, 119-23 (1984). 
20 This is not clear from the Regulation. Rather it appears that the Commission is not actually 
required to do anything, however, before it can decide whether or not there is sufficient evidence, it 
must consult within an Advisory Committee. Antidumping Regulation. supra note 8, at arts. 5(5) and 
7(1). See e.g., id. at art. 5(5) which provides: "Where it becomes apparent after consultation that the 
complaint does not provide sufficient evidence to justify initiating an investigation. then the complain-
ant shall be so informed" (emphasis added). [d. at art. 5(5). 
21 The Advisory Committee consists of representatives of Member States. Antidumping Regulation. 
supra note 8. at art. 6(1). 
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there is sufficient evidence of injurious dumping, the Regulation requires the 
Commission either to initiate a proceeding or to inform the complainant that 
there is insufficient evidence.22 This mandatory action is, however, conditioned 
on whether the Commission finds the evidence sufficient. The important issue 
is, therefore, the scope of the Commission's discretion in this determination. 
Since there are relatively precise definitions of dumping and injury, it would 
seem that there are limits analogous to those in the administrative law context. 
Whether it is possible for either side to challenge the Commission's deter-
mination will be considered in Part IV of this Article. One of the problems with 
such a review is simply the lack of a requirement that the Commission provide 
any form of explanation for its decision. Without any such explanation, the 
parties cannot know on what grounds the Commission reached its decision. It 
is then impossible for the parties to argue that the Commission reached its 
decision improperly. 
The term "decision" is used here loosely. It, like "regulation," has a precise 
legal meaning, with legal implications under Article 189 of the Treaty of 
Rome.23 Again, in Part IV of this Article the relevance of these distinctions to 
the admissibility of an action by a private party will be examined closely. 
The European Parliament also commented on the lack of information about 
the Commission's decisions in its Resolution on the Community'S antidumping 
activities in 1981.24 Upon the request of the Parliament, the Commission pub-
lished its first annual report on the Community'S antidumping activities in 
1983.25 The Commission reported: 
In order to achieve as great a degree of transparency as possible 
in its procedures, it is the Commission's practice to publish full 
details of the allegations of dumping, or subsidisation and injury 
contained in the complaint. These are given in the notices of initia-
tion which are published in the Official Journal. Similarly, the De-
cisions [and] Regulations ... which terminated the investigations set 
out all the issues of fact and law which were considered to be 
material in the investigation and give full reasons for the action 
taken. These instruments are also published in the Official Journal 
(emphasis added).26 
This practice is of no use to the complainant who wishes to challenge the 
decision not to proceed. There is still no obligation on the Commission to give 
"[d. at art. 7(1). 
23 EEC Treaty, supra note I, at arts. 189 and 190. 
2424 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C II) 39 (1981). 
25 First Annual Report of the Commission of the European Communities to the European Communities on the 
Community's Anti-dumping and Anti-subsidy Activities, 1982-1983 EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM No. 519) 2 
(1983) [hereinafter First Annual Report]. 
26 [d. at I. 
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reasons for a decision not to investigate a complaint. The Commission need 
only state that there is insufficient evidence.27 
The Commission must announce any proceeding it initiates in the Official 
Journal of the European Communities and must state the period within which 
interested parties may make known their views in writing and apply to be 
heard.28 The Commission should also advise exporters, importers, representa-
tives of the exporting country and the complainants of the proceeding.29 It shall 
then "seek all information it deems to be necessary," which may include infor-
mation from investigations in Member States and third countries.30 Exporters, 
importers and complainants have broad access to information made available 
to the Commission by a party to an investigation, but there is an equally broad 
exception for "internal documents prepared by the authorities of the Com-
munity or its Member States."31 These internal documents contain the very 
information to which all the parties will most want access, for these documents 
will indicate how and on what grounds the Commission intends to act and will 
best enable the parties to defend their interests. 
Disclosure may also be denied on the grounds of confidentiality.32 Article 8 
encourages the supplier to provide a nonconfidential summary but provides 
generally that "information will ordinarily be considered to be confidential if 
its disclosure is likely to have a significantly adverse effect upon the supplier 
.... "33 In Timex Corp. v. The Council and Commission (Timex),34 however, the Court 
made clear that confidentiality must be balanced against the interest of manu-
facturers and traders in presenting their case. 35 The Commission shall, if nec-
essary, decide on an appropriate means of providing information sufficient to 
enable the applicant to defend his interests.36 
Exporters and importers "may request to be informed of the essential facts 
and considerations on the basis of which it is intended to recommend the 
27 But see text accompanying notes 94-95. 
28 Antidumping Regulation, supra note 8, at art. 7(1)(a). 
29Id. at art. 7(1)(b). 
30Id. at arts. 7(2) and 7(3). 
3I /d. at art. 7(4)(a). This provision has been held to include not only parties subject to investigation 
but also parties whose information has been used as part of the investigation. See Timex Corp. v. E.C. 
Council and Commission, 44 Common Mkt. L.R. 550, 557-61 (1985), where information from other 
foreign undertakings had been used to calculate normal value. 
32 Antidumping Regulation, supra note 8, at art. 8. 
33 Id. at art 8(3). 
34 Timex, supra note 31. 
35 Compare the emphasis of the Court under protection of business secrets in a recent competition 
case, ECS/Akzo Chemie, 28 OJ. EVR. COMM. (No. L 374) 1,47 Common Mkt. L.R. 273 (1985), where 
the Court stated that: "[h]aving regard to the extremely serious damage which could result from 
improper communication of documents to a competitor, the Commission must, before implementing 
its decision, give the undertaking an opportunity to bring an action before the Court." 
36 Timex, supra note 31, at 570. 
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imposition of definitive duties or the definitive collection of amounts secured 
by way of a provisional duty."37 This section implies, however, that even these 
parties are not entitled to be informed of the Commission's reasoning until 
after the decision has been made. The Commission can, moreover, set a time 
limit of not less than 1 0 days within which exporters' and importers' represen-
tations may then be received.38 Thus, one Commentator explains that: "the 
Commission has had the advantage of a period of about one year for the 
preparation of its file ... while the accused parties have to verify the Commis-
sion's calculations and answer to the accusations within ten days."39 
Precisely the same critical lack of information on the Community's position 
arises in the context of hearings40 and the meeting which the Commission shall, 
on request, arrange for the parties directly concerned "so that opposing views may 
be presented and any rebuttal argument put forward."41 
The meeting provided for parties directly concerned in the controversy leads 
to a further problem rooted in the variation in terminology in Article 7. The 
Article also refers to "interested parties,"42 and "any party to an investigation."43 
The parties directly concerned are presumably those specifically mentioned 
elsewhere in the Article: exporters, importers, complainants and, perhaps, rep-
resentatives of the exporting nation. The two former terms, by contrast, seem 
broad enough to include other parties potentially affected by the result of the 
proceedings. Examples include trade unions and regional political organiza-
tions, from both the exporting and importing nations, and Community con-
sumer and upstream manufacturers groups. Not only are such groups excluded 
from the confrontational meeting, they are given no right of access to general 
information.44 Furthermore, these groups have no right to be informed of the 
Commission's reasons for the decision it makes. The exclusion of these groups 
may be criticized on grounds of procedural fairness. The exclusion is also 
inconsistent with the Commission's obligation to consider the interests of the 
Community, in addition to considering the existence of dumping and injury 
caused thereby, in deciding whether to apply a provisional or definitive anti-
dumping duty.45 
37 Antidumping Regulation, supra note 8, at art. 7(4)(b). 
3B[d. at art. 7(4)(c)(iii). 
39 Didier, EEC Antidumping Rules and Practices, 17 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 349, 364 (1980). 
40 Antidumping Regulation, supra note 8, at art. 7(5). 
41 !d. at art. 7(6). 
"[d. at arts. 7(l)(a) and 7(5). 
43 [d. at art. 7(4)(a). 
44 !d. 
4S[d. at arts. II and 12. The extent to which "community interests" are considered in practice is 
almost impossible to judge. In the Ferrochrome case involving imports from Sweden and South Africa, 
there was apparently convincing evidence of boti' dumping and injury, but the Commission's reaction 
was limited by the interests of the Community steel industry, as a consumer of ferrochromium. 21 
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Imposing a definitive antidumping duty is one of three options open to the 
Commission at the conclusion of an investigation.46 First, if protective measures 
are unnecessary, the Commission may, subject to certain controls, simply ter-
minate the proceeding.47 If it does so, Article 9(2) provides that: "The Com-
mission shall inform any representatives of the country of origin or export and 
the parties known to be concerned and shall announce the termination in the 
Official J oumal of the European Communities setting forth its basic conclusions 
and a summary of the reasons therefor."48 
A second option, under Article lO, is for the Commission to accept a promise, 
known as an undertaking, by the exporter to revise prices or regulate exports 
so that either the dumping margin or the injury is eliminated. Undertakings 
have to be offered no later than the end of the period during which represen-
tations can be made under Article 7(4)(c)(iii). It is the Commission's practice to 
accept undertakings only after a final determination has been made as to the 
existence of injurious dumping.49 The acceptance of undertakings has proved 
to be the primary method of settling antidumping proceedings because "it is 
often found that undertakings prove to be more flexible than duties as a means 
of eliminating the injury caused by dumping .... "50 If preliminary examination 
indicates that dumping and injury exist and it is in the interests of the Com-
munity to intervene to prevent injury during the proceeding, the Commission 
shall impose a provisional antidumping duty.51 If the Commission establishes 
that there is dumping and consequent injury and the interests of the Community 
call for intervention, "a definitive antidumping ... duty shall be imposed by the 
Council, acting ... on a proposal submitted by the Commission after consulta-
tion."52 The Council may decide to collect the provisional duty regardless of 
whether a definitive duty is imposed. A provisional duty may be collected where 
dumping and injury have occurred but the interests of the Community weigh 
OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 90) 3 (1978); 21 OJ. EUR. COMM (No. L 165) 20 (1978); 21 OJ. EUR. COMM. 
(No. C 232) 3 (1978). See CUNNANE & STANBROOK supra note 19, at 73-74. 
On the other hand, in replying to a question in the European Parliament, the Commission said: 
"nor is it the practice to refuse to impose anti-dumping duties where the facts as finally established 
show that dumping and material injury have occurred." 20 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 214) 5 (1977). 
46 Antidumping Regulation, supra note 8, at art. 7(9)(b). 
47 Id. at art. 9. 
4sId. at art. 9(2). 
49 Second Annual Report of the Commission of the European Communities to the European Communities on the 
Community's Anti-dumping and Anti-subsidy Activities, 1984-1985 EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM No. 721) 5 
(1984) [hereinafter Second Annual Report]. 
50 First Annual Report, supra note 25, at 4. In 1980,46 investigations were concluded by the acceptance 
of price undertakings, compared to eight concluded by the imposition of a definitive duty. For 1981, 
the figures were seven and 10 respectively; for 1982, 35 and seven and for 1983, 27 and 20. Id. at 7. 
See also, Second Annual Report, supra note 49. 
51 Antidumping Regulation, supra note 8, at art. II (I). 
"!d. at art. 12(1). Antidumping duties, whether provisional or definitive, shall be imposed by 
Regulation. !d. at art. 13(4). 
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against introducing a definitive duty. 53 For this purpose, i~ury is more narrowly 
defined than elsewhere in the Regulation, creating a situation where the Com-
mission can impose a provisional duty which the Council is never empowered 
to collect. 54 
At this stage of the proceedings, all parties may find review desirable. Both 
importers and complainants may wish to challenge the acceptance of undertak-
ings. Exporters and importers may wish to challenge the imposition or level of 
a definitive duty, and complainants may also wish to challenge its leve}.55 
III. ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW 
The 1984 Antidumping Regulation, like the 1979 Regulation, contains pro-
visions for review of both regulations imposing duties and decisions to accept 
undertakings. Article 14 declares: 
Such review may be held either at the request of a Member State 
or on the initiative of the Commission. A review shall also be held where 
an interested party so requests and submits evidence of changed circumstances 
sufficient to justify the need for such review, provided that at least one year 
has elapsed since the conclusion of the investigation (emphasis added).56 
The required evidence of altered circumstances and the one year waiting 
period are substantial changes from the 1979 Regulation, which simply required 
that a party submit "positive evidence substantiating the need for review"57 and 
prescribed no time period. 58 Both of these changes are aimed at avoiding abuse 
of Community procedures and resources. 59 
53 [d. at art. 12(2)(b). See e.g., Ferrochrome, supra note 45. 
54 See generally CUNNANE & STANBROOK, supra note 19, at 86-89. See also, Antidumping Regulation, 
supra note 8, at art. 12(2)(b). 
55 A definitive dumping duty may not exceed the dumping margin. Antidumping Regulation, supra 
note 8, at art. 13(3). 
5fj [d. at art. 14(1). 
57 22 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 339) I (1979), art. 14. 
58 This was first added in 1982 by Regulation No. 1580/82,25 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 178) 9 (1982). 
Note that there is also a change in that the request for review can now only be submitted to the 
Commission and not also to the Member States. 
59 In its Second Annual Report, the Commission found a noticeable reduction in the number of reviews 
opened in 1983. In 1983 only 10 reviews were opened. In 1982,24 were opened and 17 were opened 
in 1981. Second Annual Report, supra note 49. The Commission commented that: 
The reduction in 1983 was contrary to expectations in view of the increase in the number of 
anti-dumping ... measures in force in recent years and it remains to be seen whether or not 
this only reflects a temporary fall in the number of reviews requested by interested parties. 
/d. 
While the Report does not provide statistics on the number of reviews requested, this comment implies 
that it is close to the number opened. The congruence may, however, disappear with the stricter 
prerequisites for review in the 1984 Regulation. 
After a review has been conducted, the measures adopted may be amended, repealed or annulled. 
The First Annual Report surveyed the outcome of reviews between 1980 and 1982. First Annual Report, 
supra note 25, at Annexes L-N. During review proceedings provisional duties were imposed in fourteen 
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The review process seems to have favored complainants but examples of 
successful importers can also be found. For instance, the Commission amended 
a regulation which introduced a provisional antidumping duty on certain kinds 
of polyester yarn imported from the United States, in order to exempt imports 
of some types of sewing thread, after importers pointed out that these caused 
no injury but simply came under the same tariff code as the other dumped 
imports.6o In 1984, an Italian importer succeeded in getting the Commission to 
commence a review of the definitive duty on certain acrylic fibers from the 
United States in so far as it applied to a particular high-priced fiber. This had 
not been found to cause injury during the original investigation but was none-
theless not excluded from the application of the duty.61 This case points to one 
technical problem with the new 1984 Regulation. The Commission could find 
that there was sufficient evidence to support the request for a review, however, 
it is not obvious that there was any "change of circumstances." It would have 
been absurd to force the importer to pursue a judicial remedy because of 
apparently illegitimate behavior by the Commission. 
Recently, exporters have also been successful in obtaining review of measures. 
For example, the Spanish steel producers association obtained a reduction in 
countervailing duties to reflect an increased tax burden on them.62 
In another case, American Cyanamid obtained review and amendment of the 
regulation imposing a duty on certain acrylic fibers from the United States.63 
The Commission agreed to accept a price undertaking from the company. This 
case is difficult because the preamble recites a finding of no dumping and the 
undertakings seem to have been accepted with a view to averting dumping in 
the future. 
The same course seems to have been taken regarding p-xylene originating in 
Puerto Rico, the United States, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.64 The Commission 
accepted undertakings, inter alia, from three companies which had not exported 
cases but only one case was terminated by the imposition of a definitive duty. Of these fourteen cases, 
the review was finally terminated by the amendment of the price undertakings. In the sixth case a 
definitive duty was imposed. The case concerned electric multi-phase motors from the U.S.S.R. The 
Council cited as the reasons for its action, the scale of dumping and of injury caused. Regulation No. 
2075/82, 25 0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 220) 36 (1982). Another eight cases were concluded with the 
amendment of the price undertakings, all against the exporters. 25 0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 85) 9 
(1982); 25 0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 181) 19 (1982). Only three reviews were terminated without a 
change in the measures in force. 240.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 337) 51 (1981); 25 0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. 
L 254) 15 (1982). 
60 230.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 294) 5 (1980). See also, 13 EUR. COMM. BULL. (No. 10) 62, pt. 2.2.7 
(1980). 
61 270.]. EUR. COMM. (No. C 65) 2 (1984). 
62 260.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 116) 7 (1983). 
6, 26 0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 55) 1 (1983). 
64 260.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 101) 1 (1983). 
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during the original investigation and had not dumped in the Community during 
the period covered by the review. 
This case is also interesting for the Commission's consideration of the Com-
munity's interest in deciding whether to continue definitive duties. An assess-
ment of the Community's interest is not required by Article 14 and appears to 
have been adopted from Articles 10-12. 
There may be no administrative review of a decision to take no action. This 
is apparent from the specific reference in Article 14 to regulations imposing 
duties and decisions accepting undertakings. While a new complaint can be 
lodged at any time,65 such a procedure is inconsistent with the desire to prevent 
wastefulness and abuse in the review procedure. An administrative review 
should also be provided in these circumstances, with a limit on the time at which 
action can be requested. 
The importer may get a refund66 if he can show that the duty definitively 
collected67 exceeds the actual dumping margin.6s Application for reimburse-
ment must be made within three months of the date on which the amount to 
be definitively collected was determined and must be directed to the Commis-
sion. In another change from the 1979 Regulation, it is the Commission, and 
not the Member State, that makes the final decision on whether to grant the 
application.6g The importer can only challenge the decision of the Commission 
directly before the Court of Justice. 
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW 
In describing the complaint and review procedure provided in Regulation 
2176/84 on protection against dumped imports, three stages have been identi-
fied at which the private parties involved may wish to approach the European 
Court of Justice: 
1. When the Commission decides that there is either insufficient 
evidence to commence an investigation or sufficient evidence to 
initiate a proceeding. 
2. When, during an investigation, the Commission imposes a pro-
visional antidumping duty and when, following an investigation, the 
Commission decides on its final course of action. 
3. When the Commission decides whether to undertake a review of 
duties or undertakings, or to grant a refund of duties. 
65 CUNNANE & STAN BROOK, supra note 19, at 98. 
66 See D. LASOK & W. CAIRNS, THE CUSTOMS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 252 
(1983). The authors are incorrect in stating this to be a remedy of the exporter. 
67 The 1984 Regulation was purposely varied to limit refunds to amounts definitively collected. 
68 Antidumping Regulation, supra note 8, at art. 16(1). 
69ld. at art. 16(2). 
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At each of these stages, two questions arise: (1) the nature of the act sought 
to be challenged which determines the admissibility of the action, and (2) the 
substantive grounds on which the challenge may be made. With the increase in 
the number of antidumping actions, "the trend in the Community is towards 
an increase in litigation and the issue common to all cases on which judgment 
has been made, or is awaited, is admissibility."70 
A. General Principles 
Reference has already been made to the technical differences in the types of 
acts available to the institutions of the Community. Article 189 explains that: 
"A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety 
and directly applicable in all Member States .... decision shall be binding in 
its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed. Recommendations and opinions 
shall have no binding force."7' These distinctions determine the availability of 
judicial review under Article 173, which is the focus of discussion in this section. 
Article 173 provides: 
The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts of the Council 
and the Commission other than recommendations or opinions. It 
shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a 
Member State, the Councilor the Commission on grounds of lack 
of competence, infringement of an essential procedural require-
ment, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to 
its application, or misuse of powers. 
Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, 
institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or 
against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a 
decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual 
concern to the former. 72 
Under this provision, Member States, the Council and Commission are "priv-
ileged" applicants to the Court. A private party, however, has to fulfill the 
specific criteria of the second paragraph. He has to show either (1) that there 
is a decision addressed to him, or (2) a decision addressed to another that is 
nonetheless of a direct and individual concern to him, or (3) a measure that is 
in form a regulation but is in substance a decision and one that is of direct and 
individual concern to him. 
70 First Annual Report, supra note 25, at 10. See also 16 EUR. COMM. BULL. (No.9) 69, pt. 2.2.2 (1983). 
71 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 189. The other form of act, the directive, is not relevant in this 
context. 
72Id. at art. 173. 
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The direct challenge of regulations as such is totally excluded. This accords 
with the legislative nature of regulations. The underlying policy is "that mea-
sures of general effect ... which are basic implementations of social or economic 
policy, ought not to be interfered with by individuals until such persons are 
actually and directly affected by these measures."73 It is generally accepted, 
however, that the Court's attitude towards private suits has been particularly 
restrictive. 74 
Where an action is admitted because a regulation is in substance a decision 
which directly and individually concerns the applicant, the orthodox analysis, 
recently reaffirmed in Greek Canners Ass'n v. The Commission75 is that there must 
be distinct showings of a substantive decision, individual concern and direct 
concern. Direct concern requires that the decision's effect on the individual's 
interests must not depend on the exercise of discretion by another.76 The 
problem that arises in this area is that the tests for a decision and for individual 
concern tend to become confused. In practice, this rarely makes much differ-
ence. One commentator explains: 
It can be seen that very generally the concept of individual con-
cern functions to identify a special interest in a Community measure 
which is clearly distinct from the general interest in that act, and 
the presence of this special interest at the same time reflects the 
juridical character of the measure (emphasis added).77 
The Court has used the test of individual concern to determine whether an 
act is a regulation. In each case where the Court has held a regulation to be a 
decision, it has also found the applicants to have had an individual concern. 78 
However, in Calpak SpA v. Commission79 Advocate-General Warner pointed to 
the possibility of a situation where a single provision is of direct and individual 
73 Harding, The Private Interest in Challenging Community Action, 5 EUR. L. REV. 354, 35S (19S0). 
74 See Rasmussen, Why is Article 173 Interpreted Against Private Plaintiffs?, 5 EUR. L. REV. 112 (l9S0). 
Judicial review of Community legislation and administrative acts is one important procedural 
way of ensuring that individual rights are safeguarded. For years, however, the European 
Court, for most practical purposes, has been barring individuals from judicial review under 
Article 173 paragraph (2) of the EEC Treaty. 
Id. 
This article contains a thorough discussion of various theories for the Court's behavior. It also 
challenges the much cited article, Stein & Vining, Citizens' Access to Judicial Review of Administrative 
Action in a Transnational and Federal Context, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 219 (l976)(comparing the EEC with 
more developed federal systems). 
75 Greek Canners Ass'n v. E.C. Commission, 37 Common Mkt. L.R. 32 (l9S3). 
76 S.A. Alcan Aluminum Raeren et al. v. E.C. Commission, 1970 E.Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 385, 9 Common 
Mkt. L.R. 337 (1970). 
77 Harding, The Review of EEC Regulations and Decisions, 19 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 311, 319 (l9S2). 
78 Id. at 319-20. 
79 Calpak SpA v. E.C. Commission, 30 Common Mkt. L.R. 26 (19SI). 
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concern and appears to be a decision, but the Court is unable to separate the 
provision from the rest of the regulation.8o 
The Court's test for a decision is that found in Confederation Nationale des 
Producteurs de Fruits et Legumes v. Council. 8l The test characterizes a decision as 
applying to a limited number of persons, defined or identifiable: a regulation 
is of general application and affects categories of persons viewed abstractly and 
in their entirety.82 In International Fruit Co. v. Commission,83 the test was that the 
class of persons must be "fixed and ascertainable" so that the ostensible regu-
lation can be construed as a bundle of decisions. Any possibility, however 
theoretical and improbable, that the group might change undermines its char-
acter as a decision.84 The Court stated that the analogous test for individual 
concern was in Plaumann & Co. v. Commission;85 "Persons ... may only claim to 
be individually concerned if [the] decision affects them by reason of certain 
attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which 
they are differentiated from all other persons, and by virtue of these factors 
distinguishes them individually .... "86 
The first success with this formulation, for an applicant, was in Toepfer v. 
Commission. 87 Those affected were of a fixed and ascertainable class and the 
Court found that the factual situation differentiated them from aU other per-
sons. The Court also stressed that the defendant Commission was in a position 
to know that its action affected the interests and position of this class alone.88 
B. Application of Principles in Antidumping Cases 
1. Initiation 
As we have seen, the first stage at which review may seem desirable is when 
the Commission decides whether there is sufficient evidence to require an 
investigation. 
8°Id. 
8l Confederation Nationale des Producteurs de Fruits et Legumes v. Council of the EEC. 1962 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 471. 478-79. 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 160 (1963). 
82 Id. 
8' International Fruit Co. v. E.C. Commission (No. I), 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 411. 16 Common 
Mkt. L.R. 515 (1975). 
84 Koninklijke Scholten Honig v. E.C. Council and Commission, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 797, 28 
Common Mkt. L.R. 669 (1980). 
85 PIau mann & Co, v. EEC Commission, 1963 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 95, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 29 
(1963). 
86 International Fruit (No. l). supra note 83. at 523 (quoting Plaumann, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 47). 
87 Alfred Toepfer KG and Getreide-Import Gesellschaft GmbH v. EEC Commission. 5 Common 
Mkt. L.R. III (1966). 
88 For a general discussion and fuller analysis of the interpretative problems, see T. HARTLEY, 
FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW ch. 12 (1981). See also Harding, supra note 77. 
The stringency of the standing requirements under Article 173 is enough to exclude interested 
groups. other than importers, exporters and complainants. from further discussion. 
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The announcement in the Official Journal of the commencement of pro-
ceedings and the advice to exporters and importers "known to the Commission 
to be concerned"s9 appears to be a determination which is too general to be 
challenged. It seems easier, however, to challenge the notice to the complainant 
that its complaint does not provide sufficient evidence, as a decision. One 
scholar, Kuyper, points out that the Commission's communication is of a pro-
visional nature, since its intention not to open the investigation will not be 
definitive.90 Since the notice neither binds the Commission nor bars the com-
plainant from a further application, Kuyper argues that it does not have legal 
effects, therefore it cannot be an act reviewable under Article 173.91 
This issue recently came before the Court of Justice in EEC Seed Crushers' and 
Oil Processors' Federation (FEDIOL) v. E.C. Commission (Fediof)92 in which the 
Commission followed this reasoning. Fediol requested the Commission to ini-
tiate an antisubsidy proceeding regarding exports of soya bean oil cake from 
Brazil. The Commission investigated the disputed practices, negotiated with the 
Brazilian government and kept Fediol informed of these discussions. Fediol, 
however, also served notice on the Commission under Article 175(2) of the EEC 
Treaty. Article 175 provides for an action before the Court should the Council 
or Commission, in infringement of the Treaty, fail to act. Natural and legal 
persons are given standing as in Article 173. Kuyper also considered the pos-
sibility of an action under Article 175 and concluded that the Commission's 
discretion made it highly improbable that the complainant had any right to the 
opening of an antidumping proceeding. He noted, moreover, that the Antid-
umping Regulation provides a procedure directed against third persons that 
does not constitute an act with legal effects aimed at the complainant. Eventually, 
the Commission informed Fediol that it would not initiate an antisubsidy pro-
ceeding. Fediol then brought an action under Article 173(2). 
The Commission's arguments linked the concepts of the actions under Articles 
173 and 175. They contended that there was merely a transmission of infor-
mation and no decision. The Commission reasoned that the notice had no legal 
effects since the complainant had no right to compel the initiation of a pro-
ceeding. 
89 Antidumping Regulation, supra note 8, at art. 7(1)(b). As Cunnane and Stanbrook also note, in 
the frequently similar area of competition law, the Court held that the initiation of a proceeding does 
not constitute an act within the meaning of Article 173 but is merely a preparatory step. CUNNANE & 
STANBROOK, supra note 19. See IBM v. E.C. Commission, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 2639, 32 Common 
Mkt. L.R. 635 (1981). 
90 Kuyper, Some Reflections on the Legal Position of the Private Complainant, LEGAL ISSUES IN EUR. 
INTEGRATION 115 (1983). 
91Id. 
92 1983 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 2913, 41 Common Mkt. L.R. 244 (1984). The case actually concerned 
an antisubsidy proceeding and application for a countervailing duty, but the issues are the same as in 
an antidumping proceeding. 
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Advocate General Rozes rejected this reasoning. She made particular refer-
ence to the IBM case: 
... the Court went on to state that in principle an act is open to 
review only if it is a measure definitively laying down the position of 
the Commission or the Council on the conclusion of that procedure 
and not a provisional measure intended to pave the way for a final 
decision. It added that it would be otherwise if the measures adopted in 
the course of the preparatory proceedings were themselves the culmination of 
a special procedure distinct from that intended to permit the Commission or 
the Council to take a decision on the substante of the case (emphasis 
added).93 
Rozes felt that this was clearly the case in Fediol since the Commission un-
equivocally expressed its intention not to initiate an investigation.94 In the 
scheme of the Regulation the announcement after consultation that there was 
insufficient evidence to start a proceeding presupposed that the preliminary 
proceeding had been terminated. There was, moreover, an actual change in the 
complainant's legal position, since the action dealt with the decision not to 
commence a proceeding and not with a refusal to adopt protective measures. 
In Fediol, the Court emphasized the applicant's rights within the context of 
the antidumping scheme, the legitimate interest of Community producers in 
the adoption of antisubsidy measures, and the specific procedural rights granted 
in the 1979 Regulation. As noted previously, if the Commission's action did 
constitute a decision, it would be obligated to state reasons for it under Article 
190 of the EEC Treaty. In Fediol, the Court, by analogy to another part of the 
Regulation, simply asserted that the right to be informed under Article 5(5) of 
the Regulation meant the right to receive "a statement of the Commission's 
basic conclusions and a summary of the reasons therefor as is required by 
Article 9 .... "95 
The Court concluded: 
[C]omplainants may not be refused the right to put before the Court 
any matters which would facilitate a review as to whether the Com-
mission has observed the procedural guarantees granted to com-
plainants by Regulation 3017179 and whether or not it has commit-
ted manifest errors in its assessment of the facts, has omitted to take 
into consideration any essential matters of such a nature as to give 
rise to a belief in the existence of subsidisation or has based the 
93 Fediol, supra text accompanying note 92, at 2941. 
94 Advocate General Rozes dismissed as irrelevant the argument that the notice was not definitive 
because the Commission could subsequently initiate a proceeding of its own motion. Instead, she 
emphasized that the initiative of the applicant was brought to an end. [d. at 2942. 
95 [d. at 2934. 
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reasons for its decision on considerations amounting to a misuse of 
powers.96 
103 
The substantive grounds for review under Article 173 which the Court was 
prepared to use, thus included, misuse of powers, infringement of an essential 
procedural requirement, infringement of provisions of the Regulation, and, 
perhaps, of any rule of law relating to its application. Such rules of law might 
include a general doctrine of ultra vires, requiring the Commission's decision, 
to be reasonable, or at least that its decision must not be so unreasonable that 
it exceeds the bounds of its discretion.97 
The impact of the Fediol decision may, however, be even more considerable 
because the Court declared: 
Furthermore it must be acknowledged that, in the spirit of the 
principles which lie behind Articles 164 and 173 of the Treaty, 
complainants have the right to avail themselves, with regard both 
to the assessment of the facts and to the adoption of the protective 
measures provided for by the regulation, of a review by the Court ap-
propriate to the nature of the powers reserved to the Community 
institutions on the subject (emphasis added).98 
This comment could radically change the position of the complainant at the 
conclusion of the proceedings.99 The following section addresses that issue. 
2. Termination 
This section is concerned with challenges to regulations imposing duties, 
decisions accepting undertakings, and the refusal of the Commission to take 
any such protective measures. 
a. The Complainant 
There are two situations in which the complainant may want review at this 
stage: either the Commission has refused to take protective measures or the 
complainant considers the protection obtained to be inadequate. 
96 Id. at 2935. 
97 See Advocate General Warner, NTN Toyo Bearing Co. v. E.C. Council; Import Standard Office 
v. E.C. Council; Nippon Seiko K.K. v. E.c. Council and E.C. Commission; Koyo Seiko Co. v. E.C. 
Council and E.C. Commission; Nachi Fujikoshi Corp. v. E.C. Council (Japanese BaUbearings), 1979 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1185, 1246,25 Common Mkt. L.R. 257, 265 (1979). 
98 Fediol, supra text accompanying note 92, at 2935. 
99 See Bellis, Judicial Review of EEC Anti-dumping and Anti-subsidy Determinations After FEDlOL: the 
Emergence of a New Admissibility Test, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 539 (1984). 
This case only concerned an interlocutory judgment on admissibility. The substantive question of 
whether the Commission was under an obligation to proceed was left until later. The case was then 
removed from the Register without decision on this point. 27 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 201) 8 (1984). 
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If the Commission refuses to take protective measures, the proceedings are 
terminated under Article 9 of the Antidumping Regulation and the Commission 
will notify the complainant as one of the parties "known to be concerned." It 
seems improbable that the complainant can challenge the decision as addressed 
to him. By this stage, the complainant is only one of a number of parties involved 
in the Commission's investigation. 
There is, moreover, a logical difficulty in treating the Commission's refusal 
as a decision addressed to him. The Court has allowed the review of negative 
decisions, that is, decisions not to act in a particular way, but for purposes of 
standing, the decision has been given the character of the act as if it had been 
performed. The reasoning for this is that review of a negative decision is, in 
effect, an action for failure to act. Therefore, the only appropriate remedy is 
the provision of the act previously refused.lOo Here the relevant action is the 
provision of a regulation or a decision not addressed to the complainant. Kuyper 
asserts that in consequence no action under Article 173 is available. 101 Indeed, 
it would seem almost impossible to come within the Article 173 standing re-
quirements. In Fediol the Advocate-General was aware of this issue,102 but the 
Court's broad holding seems to give the complainant standing. 
Fediol has recently gained support in the Timex case,103 which dealt with review 
to increase duties. In Timex, the Court stressed Timex's position as sole manu-
facturer in the Community, while at the same time approving Fediol. I04 If Fediol 
is given its broad interpretation allowing complainants generally to seek review 
of protective measures, the action would be admissible without such strictures. 
b. The Importer 
Article 13(8) of the 1984 Antidumping Regulation provides that "Anti-dumping 
and countervailing duties shall be collected by Member States .... "105 Thus, it 
is the importer who actually pays the duty. If he wishes to challenge it under 
Article 173, he must also meet the standing requirements, and, as Advocate-
General Warner pointed out in the Japanese Ballbearings case,l06 it is almost 
impossible for an importer to be individually concerned. The regulation will 
apply generally to all importers and the class of importers may vary. In Japanese 
Ballbearings the Court recognized an exception for affiliates or subsidiaries of 
the exporters. Independent importers were denied standing. 
100 See T. HARTLEY, supra note 88, at 389. 
101 Kuyper, supra note 90, at 121. 
102 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. 
103 Timex, supra note 31. 
104Id. 
105 Antidumping Regulation, supra note 8, at art. 13(8). 
106 Japanese Ballbearings, supra note 97. 
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This analysis was reaffirmed in the recent case of Alusuisse Italia SpA v. E.C. 
Council and Commission,107 which concerned a challenge to a regulation imposing 
a definitive antidumping duty on imports of orthoxylene originating in the 
United States and Puerto Rico. The exporters were expressly named in the 
regulation; the importers were not. The Court found that the measures were 
of general application "because they apply to objectively determined situations 
and entail legal effects for categories of persons regarded generally and in the 
abstract."108 The duties were imposed on persons importing by reference to the 
objective criterion that they were importers. The Court also rejected the argu-
ment that the importers' involvement in the antidumping procedure gave them 
any special position, "since the distinction between a regulation and a decision 
may be based only on the nature of the measure itself and the legal effects 
which it produces and not on the procedures for its adoption."109 
The Court's final point, however, was that the importers were not left without 
a remedy. They had the option of contesting the imposition of the duty before 
the national courts and this opened the possibility of a preliminary reference 
to the European Court of Justice under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty.IIO 
c. The Exporter 
The leading antidumping case for a considerable time was the japanese Ball-
bearings case,lll which dealt, in part, with a challenge by exporters to the im-
position of a definitive antidumping duty. The regulation imposed a definitive 
duty, but suspended its application, so long as certain price undertakings were 
observed by the major producers. The regulation then authorized the collection 
of amounts, secured by way of a provisional duty, from Koyo Seiko Company 
Ltd., Nachi Fuyikoshi Corporation, NTN Toyo Bearing Company Ltd., and 
Nippon Seiko KK. 
107 Alusuisse !talia SpA v. E.C. Council and E.C. Commission, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3463, 38 
Common Mkt. L.R. 388 (1983). 
108Id. at 3472. But see Casteels Pvba v. E.C. Commission, 46 Common Mkt. L.R. 475 (1986). 
109 Alusuisse, supra note 107, at 3473, aff'd in Allied Corp. v. E.C. Commission (No. 1),44 Common 
Mkt. L.R. 572, 611 (1985). The situation is not altered by the fact that the company is an importing 
agent fo~ an exporter with standing. 
110 EEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 177: 
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: 
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty; 
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community ... 
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court 
or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give 
judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. 
!d. See also Casteels, 46 Common Mkt. L.R. at 475. 
III See Dashwood, 17 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 119 (1980); Vance, Judicial Review of Antidumping Orders 
in the United States and the European Economic Community, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 577 (1981). 
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As discussed previously, to challenge the definitive antidumping duty under 
Article 173, the exporters have to show that there was in fact a decision which 
directly and individually concerned them. In this case, these requirements were 
relatively unproblematical. Advocate-General Warner concluded that the links 
in the provisions and the naming of the producers meant that the regulation 
had "all the characteristics of a decision affecting particular persons on the basis 
of their own conduct." The Court found that the relevant article constituted a 
collective decision relating to named addressees. Under these criteria, the de-
cision in the Japanese Ballbearings case seemed to follow the Court's usual re-
strictive interpretation of Article 173. 
In most cases, however, the Court's strict interpretation of Article 173 is 
mitigated by the possibility of a preliminary reference to the Court under Article 
177 of the EEC Treaty. Most acts affecting an individual will require some form 
of implementation by the Member States. Even a "purely technical act of ap-
plication could be challenged before a Member State court, which could then 
ask for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation and validity of the 
Community measure which is really at issue."ll2 This route is not, however, 
open to the foreign exporter as the duty is collected from the importer by the 
importing state. The foreign exporter's only means of involvement in a prelim-
inary reference would be through the importer. Not only is this circuitous but 
it would also require the exporter to release information, explaining its opera-
tions to the importer, which may be adverse to its best interest. 
The need for some symmetry in the system requires easier access to the Court 
for the exporter, particularly after the liberalization of the standing require-
ments for the complainant. The Court relaxed the access standard in Allied 
Corp. v. Commission. lIS The Court held actions by the exporters admissible where 
they had been concerned by the preparatory investigation. 
This is an extremely broad standard which is curious in two respects. First, it 
adopts as its test of standing the criterion considered irrelevant by the Alusuisse 
Court,"4 (i.e., participation in the investigation). Second, although the Allied 
Corp. test can probably be restricted to the particular circumstances of an antid-
umping proceeding, it is more liberal than the tests under Article 173, discussed 
earlier. 
Both these technical criticisms can be refuted by a policy argument: if there 
is to be procedural equality in the review process, a favorable stance must be 
taken towards exporters, since they do not have the backup of an Article 177 
reference. 
112 Harding, supra note 77, at 322. 
m Allied Corp. (No.1), supra note 109, at 613. 
114 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
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3. Administrative Review 
The final stage of the process is the administrative review proceeding. If a 
party seeks review and is refused, the issue becomes whether he has recourse 
to the Court. Lasok and Cairns state that, "Since this is an individual decision, 
it would seem that any refusal by the Commission to review a case could be 
challenged before the EC J. "115 Substantively, the problem is that a review is to 
be undertaken where warranted, a phrase which leaves a large margin of 
discretion to the Commission. 
If the Commission undertakes a review but refuses to take the action re-
quested by the party concerned, it appears that the party cannot challenge this 
as an individual decision. The Commission's action is in effect a decision not to 
amend either a regulation or a decision not addressed to the party. Thus the 
party would first have to meet the standing requirements under Article 173. 
At this stage, as at earlier ones, the issue of the admissibility of a private 
party's action is complex. Once a party succeeds in bringing a case before the 
Court, the next question is the substantive grounds on which to challenge a 
Community act. 
V. SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS FOR REVIEW 
The applicant may challenge the act in question as contrary to the enabling 
regulation. Common grounds for such a challenge would be infringement of 
procedural requirements or incorrect application of tests in the regulation. An 
exporter, for example, may contend that findings of dumping and injury are, 
as a matter of law, excluded by the criteria laid down in the regulation. Prior 
to initiation, a complainant may argue that the existence of injury and dumping 
is so obvious that the Commission could not have rejected its proceeding request 
without, for instance, basing its decisions on irrelevant considerations. 
In addition, the applicant may challenge the act as contrary to a higher rule 
of law. This approach could be used at the termination and review stages. First, 
references were made to the inadequacy of information and of opportunities 
to make representations in antidumping proceedings. These show that the 
procedure fails to protect an applicant's due process rights. 
The Court has used Articles 173 116 and 164117 to develop a doctrine of 
fundamental rights that are a form of unwritten Community law, though based 
115 D. LASOK & W. CAIRNS, supra note 66, at 252. 
116 EEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 173 refers to "any rule oflaw relating to [this Treaty's] application 
117 [d. at art. 164 states; "The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation and application 
of this Treaty the law is observed." 
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on the traditions of the Member States. 118 In the Nold l19 case, for example, the 
Court held that: 
fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles 
of law which it enforces. In assuring the protection of such rights, 
this Court is required to base itself on the constitutional traditions 
common to the member-States and therefore could not allow mea-
sures which are incompatible with the fundamental rights recog-
nised and guaranteed by the constitutions of such States. 120 
Although the Court has concentrated on human rights, the principle may 
also extend to procedural rights. Examples of the types of argument that may 
be advanced are found in the second Allied Corp. case. l2l The grounds on which 
review was sought included infringement of general principles and rules of law, 
especially the defendant's rights to be heard and to know the case against him. 
In Allied Corp., during the investigation the applicants were not informed of the 
facts and considerations which would be the basis for the Commission's rec-
ommendation of definitive duties. In addition, the statement as to the method 
adopted for determining "normal value" was insufficient. Other general prin-
ciples put forward by the applicant were equality, objectivity, distributive justice, 
and that all administrative measures should be based on legally valid grounds. 122 
In each complaint, infringement of provisions of the EEC Treaty and the 
Antidumping Regulation was also pleaded. 123 
An applicant may also try to invoke the rules of the GATT as an additional 
source of higher law. 124 An applicant may argue that the imposition of a duty 
is unjustified under the criteria in Article VI of the GATTl25 and thereby 
indirectly challenge the enabling regulation. Such an approach depends on the 
status of the GATT rules in Community law. 
118 See Cappelletti, The "Mighty Problem" of Judicial Review and the Contribution of Comparative Analysis, 
2 LEGAL ISSUES IN EUR. INTEGRATION 1 (1979). 
119 Firma]. Nold v. E.C. Commission, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. 338, 354 (1974). 
120 [d. 
121 26 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 112) 4 (1983). 
122 [d. at 5. 
123 The corporation argued that the EEC authorities erred in using criteria contained in undertakings 
that had been withdrawn. The Court held that a duty may not exceed the dumping margin and should 
be less if adequate to eliminate injury. In this case, there was nothing to demonstrate that the Council 
had considered this point. The regulation imposing a definitive duty was, therefore, held void. The 
ground for so finding was, thus, the standard administrative law one of failure to take into account 
relevant considerations and/or consideration of irrelevant factors. Allied Corp. v. E.C. Council (No. 
2),47 Common Mkt. L.R. 605 (1986). 
124 See supra note 9. 
125 [d. 
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In Hauptzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg & Cie, 126 the Court considered four factors 
as determining the direct effect of an international agreement in Community 
law: (1) the nature and structure of the agreement; (2) the intention of the 
parties; (3) whether the agreement itself allowed for direct effects or whether 
other means of application had to be considered; and (4) whether the provision 
was sufficiently precise to be directly effective. 127 Applying these criteria, it 
would seem unlikely that Article VI could have an effect in Community law. 
Dispute over the status of the GATT has continued. 128 In the recent decision, 
Amministrazione Delle Finanze v. SPI,129 the Court found that the jurisdiction 
conferred upon it in order to ensure the uniform interpretation of Community 
law must include a determination of the scope and effect of the rules of the 
GATT within the Community. However, applying criteria from International 
Fruit (No. 3)130 and considering the general scheme of the GATT, the Court 
found that Article VI was not direcdy applicable. l3I 
VI. U.S. ANTIDUMPING LEGISLATION: A COMPARISON 
A. Introduction 
The U.S. method of determining whether to impose an antidumping duty 
provides a number of instructive procedural contrasts. The process will first be 
outlined briefly and the availability of administrative and judicial review will 
then be considered in more detail. 
The relevant legislation in the United States is Subtitle IV of the Tariff Act 
of 1930, as amended by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 and the Trade and 
Tariff Act of 1984. 132 
B. Antidumping Proceedings 
In the United States the authority to administer the antidumping law rests 
with the Secretary of Commerce,133 while the administering agency is the In-
ternational Trade Administration (ITA). This body is responsible for making 
126 Hauptzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg & Cie, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3641, 36 Common Mkt. 
L.R. I (1983). 
127/d. at 3653-55. 
128 See Bebr, Agreements Concluded by the Community and their Possible Direct Effect: From International 
Fruit Company to Kupferberg, 20 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 35 (1983). 
129 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Societa Petrolifera Italiana SpA (SPI) and SpA 
Michelin Italiana (SAM I) (SAMI), 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 801, 39 Common Mkt. L.R. 354 (1984). 
130 International Fruit Co. v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit (No.3), 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. 
Rep. 1219, 16 Common Mkt. L.R. 1(1975). 
131 SAMI, supra note 129, at 830. 
132 19 U.S.C.A. § § 1671-1677h (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
J33 See Exec. Order No. 12188, reprinted in 19 U.S.C.A. § 2171,155-58 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
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determinations as to the existence of dumping. 134 However. Injury 
determinations135 are made by an independent body. the International Trade 
Commission (ITC). 
This division of responsibilities provides an immediate contrast with the EEC 
where all the significant factual determinations are made by the Commission. 
Commentators have noted that because the final decision in the EEC rests with 
the overtly political Council. the EEC decision model "is structured to allow 
policy considerations to play an imporatnt role in dumping determinations."136 
This analysis raises two issues. First. as previously noted. the Council tends to 
accept the Comission's recommendations unaltered. Second. the weight that the 
Commission gives to the interests of the Community varies considerably. 137 
Thus. while the rationale behind the U.S. division might be cloudy. it is also 
probably of little importance. 
In the United States. proceedings may be commenced on the Secretary's 
initiative or by a petition filed by an interested party on behalf of a domestic 
industry.138 The term "interested party"139 includes a manufacturer. producer. 
or wholesaler of a like product140 in the United States. a union or other group 
of workers. representative of such an industry and a trade or business association 
whose members manufacture. produce or wholesale a like product. This defi-
nition provides for broader and more general access than the EEC Regulation. 
The petition must allege "the elements necessary for the imposition of the 
[antidumping] duty."141 The standard of proof required to compel initiation of 
a proceeding is fairly low. In Roses Inc. v. United States. 142 Judge Rao stated: "It 
is thus clear that Congress intended to alleviate the burden of petitioners in 
initiating antidumping proceedings. and to limit the information considered by 
the administering authority to that included in the petition and supporting data 
submitted by the petitioner and facts 'within the public domain ... ·143 
134 Essentially. dumping occurs if sales in the u.s. are at less than fair value. i.e .• at a lower price 
than in the manufacturer's home market. and these sales cause or threaten to cause material injury to 
a u.s. industry or to retard its establishment. 
135 Material injury is defined as "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial or unimportant" 
and numerous relevant factors are specified. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
136 Bryan and Boursereau. Antidumping Law in the European Communities and the United States: A 
Comparative Analysis. 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 631. 679 (1985). 
137 See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. 
138 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673a (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
139 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(9)(C) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
140 The term "like product" means a product which is like. or in the absence of like, most similar in 
characteristics and uses to the article subject to investigation, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(10) (West 1980 & 
Supp. 1986). 
141 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673a(b)(l) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
142 3 Ct. Int'l Trade 110, 538 F. Supp. 418 (1982). aII'd in part and rev'd in part I CA FC 39, 706 
F.2d 1563 (1983). 
143Id. at 421. 
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Another contrast between the EEC and U.S. regulations is the specific time 
limits the U.S. law prescribes for the completion of various stages of the pro-
ceedings. While the U.S. proceedings are noticeably more structured, there is 
still room for flexibility in given circumstances. 144 
In the EEC proceedings and review, the parties' right to be heard is limited. 
In the U.S. proceedings the Secretary is required to provide opportunities for 
consultation with all parties to the investigation, regarding the ITA's findings 
and information, prior to making its preliminary determination. 145 The hearing 
is not, however, adversarial. In this respect, the procedure is as inadequate as 
that of the EEC. 
In contrast, however, there is a more equitable provision for access to infor-
mation under the U.S. procedure. First, it is a fundamental feature that all 
decisions, both preliminary and final, must be published in the Federal Register 
with a statement of the facts and law on which the determination is based. 146 
Further, any judicial review will be based on the proceeding record. The ITA 
and ITC are required to keep detailed records of meetings with interested 
parties or other persons who provide factual information. 147 
Clearly, some information may be confidential and protected. In this area the 
U.S. law is similar to Article 8 of the EEC Regulation. Parties who wish to 
preserve the confidentiality of their information must follow specified proce-
dures. 14B The ITA or ITC may, like the EEC authorities, decide that a claim 
144 The initial determination as to the sufficiency of the petition must be made within 20 days. 19 
U.S.C.A. § 1673a(c) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). If the proceeding goes ahead, the ITC must make a 
preliminary determination on the issue of injury within 45 days of the filing of the petition or 
notification by the Secretary, while the ITA's determination on dumping must normally be made 
within 160 days of filing of the petition or commencement of the investigation. 19 U.S.C.A. 
§ § l673b(a); 1673b(b)(I) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
If the preliminary determination is affirmative, the Secretary suspends liquidation of all entries, 
which effectively means that the fixing of the final duty payable is suspended. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673b(d) 
(West 1980 & Supp. 1986). Liquidation may be suspended retroactively if the Secretary finds "critical 
circumstances," i.e., that there have been massive imports of the product over a short period and 
either there is a history of dumping or the importer knew or should have known that the product 
was being dumped. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673b(e) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). A determination of negative 
critical circumstances is not reviewable on its own. See Haarman & Reimer Corp. v. United States, I 
Ct. Int'l Trade 148, 509 F. Supp. 1276 (1981). 
The ITA's final determination should normally be within 75 days of the preliminary determination. 
This determination may be postponed in limited circumstances. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673d(a) (West 
1980 & Supp. 1986). The lTC's final determination should be made before the later of either the 
120th day after the ITA's preliminary determination or the 45th day after the final determination. 
Following a negative preliminary determination but positive final determination by the Secretary, the 
lTC's determination is required within 75 days of the final determination. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673(b)(3)(d) 
(West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
145 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677c(a)(l) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
146 19 U.S.C.A. § § 1673a(c) and l673d(d) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
147 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677f(a)(3) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
148 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677f(b) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
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for confidentiality is unwarranted. Under the U.S. law, however, further pro-
vision for the release of confidential information exists. The ITA or ITC may 
release information under a "protective order."149 
If a request for confidential information is denied, the party may apply to 
the Court of International Trade which may release the information under a 
protective order. 150 This is a more direct form of relief than that available to a 
party to an EEC proceeding. To compel release of information, in an EEC 
proceeding one would have to seek review of the Commission decision not to 
release the information. This is a circuitous and complicated route. 
U.S. law further provides that in any proceedings for judicial review, the 
confidentiality of any documents shall be preserved, but the court may examine 
the material and disclose it under appropriate terms and conditions. 151 In reach-
ing such decisions, the court applies a balancing test, weighing the need of the 
litigant for access to information against the public interest in preserving con-
fidential business information from competitors and the need of the government 
to obtain information in future proceedings. 152 Under Article 8 of the EEC 
Regulation, information will be deemed confidential if its disclosure "is likely to 
have a significantly adverse effect upon the supplier or the source of the 
information."153 The supplier should provide a nonconfidential summary, but, 
apart from this, on its terms, the Article, gives no weight to the applicant's need 
for information. 
Finally, the Secretary may terminate a proceeding at any time by withdrawing 
the initiating petition. 154 Alternatively, an investigation may be suspended on 
the acceptance, by the Secretary, of either an agreement to eliminate completely 
sales at less than fair value or to cease exports or an agreement which eliminates 
the injurious effect. 155 Before suspension, the Secretary must consult the peti-
tioner, notify all the parties and the lTC, provide the petitioner with a copy of 
149 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677f(c)(I)(S) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
150 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677f(c)(2) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
151 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(b)(2)(B) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
152 American Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, 5 Ct. Int'l Trade 256,566 F. Supp. 1538 (1983); 
Freres v. United States, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 239, 554 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (1982). The court is not 
entitled, however, to release information. submitted by non-parties. 
153 Antidumping Regulation, supra note 8, at art. 8(3). This article also provides that in disclosing 
general information and in giving the reasons authorities should "take into account the legitimate interest 
of the parties concerned that their business secrets should not be divulged." !d. at 8(5). This provision 
is unusual, because it places the onus on the Community authorities themselves. It is also the only 
indication of the factors to be considered in determining the confidentiality of documents. 
154 If the withdrawal is based on an agreement to restrict the volume of imports, the Secretary must 
also determine that the termination is in the public interest. 
155 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673c (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). The latter type of agreement is limited to cases 
involving "extraordinary circumstances," meaning that the suspension of the investigation will be more 
beneficial to the domestic industry than its continuation, and cases which are "complex." In all cases, 
the Secretary must also be satisfied that the suspension is in the public interest. 
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the agreement and permit all parties to submit opinions and information. 156 
The U.S. procedure is analagous to the Community method of accepting un-
dertakings but has greater procedural safeguards. 157 
C. Administrative Review 
Under U.S. law, administrative review exists in a number of specified circum-
stances. The Secretary shall, if so requested, annually review the dumping 
margin and compliance with any agreement which resulted in the suspension 
of an investigation. 15s 
The ITC and ITA may review a final affirmative determination or an accepted 
agreement, on receiving information or a request for review, which shows a 
sufficient change in circumstances. 159 Following such a review, the Secretary 
may revoke an antidumping order in whole or in part. 160 This type of review 
parallels the only review available within the EEC.161 In contrast with the min-
imal procedural provisions in Article 14 of the EEC Regulation, the U.S. law 
specifically provides that the authority conducting the review must, on request, 
hold a hearing on the record for an interested party.162 
Agreements to eliminate injurious effects may be reviewed once an interested 
domestic party files a petition with the ITC.16! 
Both domestic parties and exporters that account for a significant proportion 
of exports to the United States may also request continuation of the investigation 
within 20 days of suspension. 164 The investigation must then be continued. If 
its conclusion is affirmative, the agreement remains intact; if its conclusion is 
negative, the agreement has no effect at all. 
D. Judicial Review 
As previously discussed, the U.S. procedure roughly parallels the EEC's. The 
parties involved may wish to obtain review of official decisions at four broadly 
156 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673c(e) (West 1980 Be Supp. 1986). 
157 Notice of suspension is to be published in the Federal Register, with a simultaneous affirmative 
preliminary determination. 
158 19 U.S.C.A. § 1675 (West 1980 Be Supp. 1986). 
159 19 U.S.C.A. § 1675(b)(I) (West 1980 Be Supp. 1986). 
160 19 U.S.C.A. § 1675(c) (West 1980 Be Supp. 1986). 
161 See su/»,a notes 56-59 and accompanying text. 
162 19 U.S.C.A. § 1675(d) (West 1980 Be Supp. 1986). The lTC's refusal to review a determination 
for changed circumstances is expressly susceptible to judicial review under 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(a)(I)(A) 
(West 1980 Be Supp. 1986). While any such ITA decisions and any decision not to review a suspensory 
agreement is reviewable under the residuary provision of § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) (West 1980 Be Supp. 
1986). No explanation for the disparity appears from the legislative history. 
163 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673 (West 1980 Be Supp. 1986). 
164 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673c(h) (West 1980 Be Supp. 1986). 
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similar stages: the initiation of the proceedings, the preliminary determinations, 
the final determinations, and determinations on administrative review. 
Judicial review is addressed in U.S.C.A. § 1516(a), which divides determina-
tions into two categories, namely certain determinations and reviewable deter-
minations. 16s These categories differ according to the scope of review and the 
method of commencing proceedings. Review of certain determinations must 
begin within 30 days of publication in the Federal Register, by filing concurrently 
a summons and a complaint, setting out the factual findings and legal conclu-
sions contested. Review of reviewable determinations may be commenced by 
filing a summons within 30 days of publication and the complaint within another 
30 days.166 
In marked contrast to the EEC procedure where the admissibility of action 
is strictly limited by Article 173, review can be sought by any interested party, 
which includes the U.S. importers, business associations, and the full spectrum 
of foreign parties.167 In addition to these powers, the Court of International 
Trade possesses a residual jurisdiction over tariff and trade matters. 16S Such 
actions may be commenced by any person adversely affected or aggrieved by 
governmental action. 169 This provision has been used, for example, to give 
jurisdiction in an action for an order of mandamus that the ITA reduce the 
level of a countervailing duty, as this is not otherwise a determination specifically 
subject to review. 170 Although this section does not allow review in all feasible 
situations, it provides a vital element of flexibility. 
A determination not to initiate an investigation is reviewable as a certain 
determination. l7l On the other hand, there is no provision for the review of a 
positive decision to initiate an investigation, and it has been held that this is not 
available under the residual provision. 172 
A preliminary negative determination as to injury by the ITC is reviewable. 173 
There is no provision for the review of an affirmative determination, and review 
of ITA fair value determinations is limited to final determinations. 174 Other 
preliminary determinations, for example, as to critical circumstances or extraor-
dinary circumstances, may not be reviewed. 
165 19 V.S.C.A. § § 1516a(a)(l) and (2) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
166 19 V.S.C.A. § 1516a(a)(2)(A) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
167 19 V.S.C.A. § 1677(9) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
168 28 V.S.C.A. § 1581(i) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
169 5 V.S.C.A. § 702 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
170 Ceramica Regiomontana v. Vnited States, 5 Ct. Int'l Trade 23, 557 F. Supp. 596 (1983). 
171 19 V.S.C.A. § 1516a(a)(l)(A) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
172 National Latex Products Co. v. Vnited States, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 110 (1982). 
17g 19 V.S.C.A. § 1516a(a)(I)(B) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
174 19 V.S.C.A. § 1516a(a)(2)(B) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
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The U.S. law states that reviewable determinations include: 
(i) Final affirmative determinations by the administering authority 
and by the Commission ... including any negative part of such a 
determination [other than a part referred to in clause (ii)]. 
(ii) A final negative determination by the administering authority 
or the Commission ... including, at the option of the appellant, any 
part of a final affirmative determination which specifically excludes 
any company or product. I75 
115 
Thus, all final determinations are reviewable and affirmative and negative 
parts of such determinations are separable. 176 Moreover, if the ITA's affirmative 
determination is followed by a negative ITC determination as to i~ury, so that 
no antidumping order is ever issued, an exporter may still challenge the affir-
mative determination. I77 
As already discussed, a proceeding may also be brought to an end by the 
acceptance of agreements. Such a decision to suspend an investigation is also 
subject to judicial review. 178 
Refusals to initiate administrative review are, in general, subject to judicial 
review. The only decision that is not subject to such review is a refusal to review 
an agreement to eliminate injurious effects. There is no valid reason for this, it 
may just be a gap in judicial coverage. Such an agreement should itself be 
susceptible to judicial review, as there is a specific provision for review of the 
Commission's determinations on injurious effects. 179 
E. Substantive Grounds for Review 
The statutory standards for review in the United States encapsulate many of 
the ideas mooted in the discussion of this aspect of the EEC procedure. Certain 
determinations will be unlawful if they are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,"18o while a reviewable de-
termination will be unlawful if "unsupported by substantial evidence on the 
I75 19 U.S.C.A. § § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(i) & (iii) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
176 This clarifies the issue that arose in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States. 6 Ct. Int'l Trade 
164,571 F. Supp. 1265, rev'd 2 CA FC 112,742 F.2d 1405 (1984). 
177 See Huffy Corp. v. United States, 604 F. Supp. 1250. 
178 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iv) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). This appears to cover agreements to 
eliminate injurious effects because paragraph (v) makes provision for the relevant Commission deter-
minations for injurious effects under § 1671(c) and § 1673c(h). 
179 [d. 
180 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(b)(l)(A) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
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record, or otherwise not in accordance with law."'81 This latter test is potentially 
narrower as a document is inadmissible if it does not form part of the record, 
even if it should have been considered. ls2 It would seem to follow that this 
failure will not render the decision otherwise contrary to law, but such a failure 
could be an abuse of discretion or result in an arbitrary decision within the first 
test. In general, however, the petitioner is limited to making his challenge on 
the basis of the information available to the authority at the time and cannot 
raise new issues at trial. ,s3 Equally, the record should not contain extraneous 
materials such as data from other investigations. ,s4 
Under both tests, it is not the Court's function to weigh the evidence or 
substitute its own judgment, but rather to decide whether the authority had 
substantial evidence on which it could have based its decision. ,s5 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Community's antidumping legislation presents a difficult and complex 
area, especially regarding procedure and review. In addition, recent cases have 
raised new uncertainties in the field. 
The damages available to a party involved in an antidumping review in the 
Court of Justice are outside the scope of this discussion. While theoretically 
available, damages have never been awarded in an antidumping case. This 
Article illustrates the difficult journey to and through the Court of Justice for 
any party ever to reach this stage. 
U.S. procedure is equally complex. However, to some extent, the pitfalls for 
potential applicants are alleviated by more precise provisions, broader and fairer 
standards of admissibility, and better access to relevant information. 
As European Communities law continues to develop, the following consid-
erations need to be taken into account. On the one hand, antidumping pro-
ceedings involve social and economic issues in an international setting, such that 
181 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(b)(I)(B) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). For these purposes, the record consists 
of: 
(i) a copy of all information presented to or obtained by the Secretary, the administering 
authority, or the Commission during the course of the administrative proceeding, including 
all governmental memoranda pertaining to the case and the record of ex parte meetings 
required to be kept ... ; and 
(ii) a copy of the determination, all transcripts or records of conferences or hearings, and 
all notices published in the Federal Register. 
19 U.S.C.A. § § 1516a(b)(2)(A)(i) and (ii) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
182 PPG Industries Inc. v. United States, 5 Ct. Int'l Trade 282 (1983). 
18S Border Brokerage Co. v. United States, 484 F. Supp. 901 (1979), afl'd 68 C.C.P.A. 32, CAD 
1262,646 F.2d 539 (1981) 
184 Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 5 Ct. Int'l Trade 236, 566 F. Supp. 346 (1983). 
185 SCM Corp. v. United States, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 7, 544 F. Supp. 194, 202 (1982); Alberta Gas 
Chemicals v. United States, 1 Ct. Int'I Trade 312,515 F. Supp. 780 (1981); Armstrong Bros. Tool Co. 
v. United States, 84 Cust. Ct. 102,489 F. Supp. 269 (1980). 
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interference by private parties is undesirable. On the other hand, parties who 
are assessed a duty deserve satisfactory procedural safeguards. From this per-
spective, the complainant has the least compelling claim to access to the Court, 
while the exporters and importers deserve the most protection. The present 
law attempts to meet both of these policies. It provides a fertile source of 
litigation which is likely to have wider ramifications for Community law. The 
development of antidumping law will be watched with interest and speculation. 
